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ABSTRACT
This article reconsiders the theoretical role of the genetic code. By drawing on published
and unpublished sources from the 1950s, I analyse how the code metaphor was actually
employed by the scientists who first promoted its use. The analysis shows that the term
‘code’ picked out mechanism sketches, consisting of more or less detailed descriptions of
ordinary molecular components, processes, and structural properties of the mechanism
of protein synthesis. The sketches provided how-possibly explanations for the ordering
of amino acids by nucleic acids (the ‘coding problem’). I argue that employing the code
metaphor was justified in virtue of its descriptive-denotational and explanatory roles,
and because it highlighted a similarity with conventional codes that was particularly
salient at the time.
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1 Introduction
The ‘genetic code’ is perhaps one of the most familiar metaphors in biology.
At one level the metaphor is nowadays simply a label for a set of causal
relations important for protein synthesis, namely, the mapping between
RNA base triplets and amino acids. But the widespread use of semantic lan-
guage in molecular biology, as exemplified by ‘code’, is controversial among
Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 67 (2016), 707–730
 The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.doi:10.1093/bjps/axv007
Advance Access published on March 15, 2015
 at U
niversity of A
berdeen on N
ovem
ber 4, 2016
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
historzians and philosophers of biology (for example, Sarkar [1996]; Godfrey-
Smith [2000]; Kay [2000]; Griffiths [2001]). At stake is the question of whether
using apparently semantic concepts is legitimate and whether they should be
taken literally, indicating the presence of some semantic or proto-semantic
properties in a domain of science that is otherwise solidly grounded in physics
and chemistry. With respect to the genetic code, for instance, some have
argued that its use is inappropriate and misleading (Kay [2000]), while
others have defended it as well-motivated (for example, Godfrey-Smith
[2000]; Maynard Smith [2000]).
In these discussions, cognate concepts like genetic code and genetic infor-
mation are often treated together without paying much attention to possible
differences. More importantly, despite a wealth of historical sources and a rich
historiography of early research into protein synthesis (for example, de
Chadarevian [1996]; Judson [1996]; Rheinberger [1997]; Kay [2000]), we still
know very little about how the scientists themselves used the code metaphor in
practice, especially at the time when it was introduced and began to be em-
ployed in a sustained way. Yet a detailed analysis of actual usage at that time
could be revealing. It could show (i) to what ‘code’ referred, if anything, (ii)
what the properties of its referent were, (iii) whether these properties included
arbitrariness and in some sense semantic features, and (iv) whether it played
valuable theoretical roles. Answers to these questions will allow historical
conclusions about a key episode in the history of molecular genetics. But
they will also have philosophical import. If it can be shown, for example,
that the code metaphor played specific theoretical roles in the emerging science
of molecular biology, then its use could be justified by appeal to these roles. It
may also turn out that the referent of ‘code’ bore certain similarities with
human symbol systems, which could again motivate its application to molecu-
lar biology.
The aim of this article is to provide such an analysis and draw the relevant
philosophical conclusions. The analysis is based on a close reading of
both published material and unpublished sources by the proponents of non-
experimental research into protein synthesis in the 1950s (for example, Francis
Crick, George Gamow, James Watson, and their co-workers). In recent years,
unpublished material has become readily available via online archives.1 Some
restrictions were necessary in order to keep the project manageable. First, the
analysis of actual usage is limited to the period between 1953 and 1958, which
saw the first steps towards elucidating protein synthesis and the gradual con-
solidation of the code metaphor. Second, the analysis is restricted to the code
1 The documents of well-known figures like Crick and Watson are better represented in online
archives, which is likely to have introduced a bias. For practical reasons, this limitation was
deemed acceptable. Furthermore, these researchers were the main users of the code concept and
are thus the natural focus of any attempt to identify its actual usage.
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metaphor, putting aside cognate notions like genetic information. Third, I
focus on the possible descriptive and explanatory roles of the code metaphor,
bracketing potential predictive and heuristic uses (to be explored elsewhere).
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the results of the
analysis of actual usage. Section 3 argues that the code concept picked out
mechanism sketches and thus played useful descriptive and explanatory
roles. Section 4 refines these claims by addressing the alleged abstractness of
coding schemes and the expendability of the code concept. In Section 5 I
address the (in)significance of arbitrariness for understanding the status of
coding.
2 Coding Schemes in the 1950s
2.1 The research problem: Determining amino acid sequences
Biochemists recognized protein synthesis as a research problem since at least
the 1940s (Judson [1996]; Rheinberger [1997]). They also acknowledged that
one of its crucial aspects was arranging amino acids into linear sequences. By
1953, two groups of hypotheses had emerged to explain this process
(Campbell and Work [1953]). According to the first group, protein-specific
amino acid sequences resulted from a series of highly specific enzymatic reac-
tions: enzymes would catalyse the linkage between two adjacent amino acids,
with different enzymes responsible for conjoining different types of amino
acids (for example, ‘transpeptidation theory’). According to the second
group of hypotheses, new amino acid chains were the result of free amino
acids attaching temporarily to pre-existing protein or nucleic acid templates
(for example, Haurowitz [1950]; Dounce [1952]).
Efforts to understand protein synthesis were re-invigorated by Watson and
Crick’s ([1953a]) double helix model of DNA. The model allowed innumerable
permutations of bases along its sugar-phosphate backbone and, hence, the
possibility of it being responsible for the order of amino acids in proteins
(Olby [1994], pp. 427, 434; Judson [1996], p. 280). George Gamow, a cosmolo-
gist, was quick to explore this possibility. He developed the first model of
protein synthesis based on Watson and Crick’s structure. When in October
1953 he submitted his manuscript to Nature (published as Gamow [1954a]), he
wrote to Linus Pauling:
Ever since I read the article of Watson and Crick last June, I was trying
to figure out how a long number written in a fourdigital system (i.e.
nucleic acid molecule) can determine unickly [sic] a correspondingly long
word based on [a] 20-letter-alphabet (i.e. an enzime [sic] molecule).
(Gamow [1953])
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Implicit in Gamow’s quote is a hypothesis about the ‘determination’ of amino
sequence that had been anticipated by earlier template models: the amino
acid order in proteins is determined solely by the linear order of discrete
elements along the template, rather than by the template’s three-dimensional
shape.2 Watson made the last point explicit in handwritten notes: ‘[w]e believe
[the] secondary structure to be irrelevant to the main argument’ (Watson
[1954–55]). The ‘secondary structure’ referred to the conformation (rather
than base sequence) of the nucleic acid template and ‘the main argument’ to
‘the determination of sequence’ of amino acids by nucleic acids. A few years
later, Crick ([1958a]) articulated this idea as part of his ‘sequence hypothesis’.
The assumption that the amino acid sequence only depends on the base
sequence simplified the task of understanding protein synthesis because it
allowed the bracketing of a possible role for the three-dimensional conform-
ation of nucleic acids. The task became to understand how a nucleic acid
sequence could order incoming amino acids into a linear chain. Since nucleic
acids were thought to be composed of four types of bases and polypeptides of
twenty kinds of amino acids,3 there were too few bases for each type of base to
select one type of amino acid. There would have to be some other way by
which nucleic acids can order amino acids. Scientists like Crick, Gamow,
Watson, Brenner, and their co-workers agreed both on the nature of this
task and the key assumption underlying it. Most of Gamow’s, Crick’s, and
Brenner’s publications on protein synthesis between 1954 and 1958 contain
opening comments that state or imply both points (for example, Gamow
[1954a]; Gamow et al. [1956]; Brenner [1957]; Crick [1958a]). Crick articulated
them explicitly:
[. . .] the order of the amino acids is determined by the order of the
nucleotides of the nucleic acid. There are some twenty naturally
occurring amino acids commonly found in proteins, but (usually) only
four different nucleotides. The problem of how a sequence of four things
(nucleotides) can determine a sequence of twenty things (amino acids) is
known as the ‘coding’ problem. (Crick et al. [1957], p. 416)
2.2 The solution: Mapping schemes or ‘codes’
The coding problem was addressed by schemes that attempted to explain how
a sequence of four types of bases can determine a sequence of twenty
2 For molecular biologists in the 1950s, ‘determination’ expressed a kind of exclusive causal
dependence of the amino acid order on the nucleic acid order. A further explication of their
notion of determination is beyond the scope of this article, as is an assessment of whether it
amounts to a sound causal notion. For attempts in this direction, see (Waters [2007]; Woodward
[2010]; Stegmann [2014]).
3 Watson and Crick drew up the list of twenty naturally occurring amino acids when they received
Gamow’s manuscript in the summer of 1953 (Judson [1996], p. 258).
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amino acids. All schemes shared some core features: they all hypothesized
that nucleic acid chains consisted of strings of smaller units with the causal
disposition to select one type of amino acid to be added to the growing
peptide.
The period between 1953 and 1958 saw a bewildering variety of such hypo-
thetical units and their relations with amino acids (Tables 1 and 2). A big
divide existed between ‘overlapping’ and ‘non-overlapping’ schemes (Crick
[1955]; Ledley [1955]; Brenner [1957]; Crick et al. [1957]; Gamow and Ycˇas
[1958]; Golomb et al. [1958]). In non-overlapping schemes, all the individual
components of a template unit (for example, the bases C, G, and A, in the unit
CGA) were taken to belong to that unit only, and the unit selected only one
amino acid while exerting no influence on the addition of the preceding or
following amino acid. In overlapping schemes, by contrast, the components of
a given template unit were part of the preceding or following unit (for ex-
ample, the token base A in the unit CGA would be part of the next unit GAT).
Within each of these two groups were further differences, mostly relating to
the template units:
. Degeneracy: In ‘degenerate’ schemes (Crick [1955]), more than one
type of template unit could specify one type of amino acid; in some
degenerate codes all amino acids had the same level of degeneracy
(labelled ‘uniform’ in Tables 1–2), in others the level varied between
amino acids (‘varying’).
. Attachment: Amino acids were taken to either attach directly to template
units (‘direct’ in Tables 1–2) or to attract adaptor molecules that carry
certain amino acids (‘indirect’); the fact that some schemes posited direct
interactions between template units and amino acids will be significant
for the discussion of arbitrariness (Section 5).
. Directionality: In ‘directional’ schemes (Crick [1955]), a given nucleic acid
sequence specified an amino acid sequence only if ‘read’ in one direction;
similarly, at a lower level, individual template units specified amino acids
only if ‘read’ in one direction.
. Chemical identity of the template: The template was thought to consist of
DNA, RNA, or a combination of nucleic and amino acids.
. Single/Double: Synthesis was hypothesized to occur on a single or double
strand (of nucleic acid).
. One/Both: If nucleic acids served as templates in double-stranded form,
then a template unit could include bases either from one strand or from
both strands.
. Cardinality: The number of bases per template unit, for example, three
RNA bases (triplet).
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As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, all schemes involved claims about the
nature of hypothetical entities and interactions that were thought to be part of
the mechanism of protein synthesis. Gamow’s ([1954a]) scheme, for instance,
posited diamond-shaped holes on the DNA double helix as well as stereo-
chemical interactions between them and incoming amino acids. From
Gamow’s proposal, Crick generalized ‘a code with the following properties’:
four nucleic acid bases (‘letters’), template units that are overlapping triplets,
all triplets specify an amino acid, and all amino acids are specified by at least
one triplet (Crick [1955], p. 10). Unlike Gamow’s scheme, Crick’s generalized
version did not make assumptions about diamond-shaped holes and the like.
Even so, it assumed that the template units that determine an amino acid are
base triplets, that the base triplets are overlapping, and so on. Finally, con-
sider Crick et al.’s ‘comma-less’ scheme: What Crick ([1957], p. 419) called a
‘physical interpretation’ of this scheme posited a single-stranded RNA as a
template, which interacted via hydrogen bonding with trinucleotide adaptor
molecules (each of which carrying one amino acid). But even without this
physical interpretation, Crick’s comma-less scheme made non-trivial assump-
tions about the physical components of the mechanism. These assumptions
included that there are two sets of components—amino acids and base
triplets—; that the base triplets are non-overlapping; and that there is some
stereochemical interaction between triplets and amino acids such that the se-
quence of triplets determines the amino acid sequence.
The three examples show that different schemes provided varying degrees of
detail. Crick’s generalized Gamow scheme and his comma-less scheme offered
comparatively little detail. They postulated base triplets, for instance, but
remained silent on how the triplets were spatially organized. Gamow’s dia-
mond scheme, by contrast, assumed that a triplet forms three of the four
points of a diamond-shaped hole (the fourth point consisting of one of the
paired-up bases). Furthermore, Gamow’s scheme was committed to a DNA
double helix template, whereas Crick’s two other proposals were explicitly
neutral about whether the template was RNA or DNA. But even Gamow’s
diamond scheme was not fully specified—for example, how exactly the amino
acids were to interact with the holes so as to generate a specific fit remained an
open question.
In addition to hypotheses about the physical components of protein syn-
thesis, all schemes made claims about the mapping between template units and
amino acids. ‘Degeneracy’ (Crick [1955], p. 5), for example, referred to a set-
theoretic relation between the sets of template units and amino acids: every
element of the co-domain (set of amino acids) was mapped to by at least one
template unit; the relation was thought to be non-injective and surjective.
Crick’s comma-less system assumed a non-functional relation in which only
twenty of the sixty-four template units map to the twenty amino acids. An
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important property of these relations was that they could be shared by other-
wise very different schemes. The triangular and dyad scheme, for instance,
shared the degenerate type of mapping (see Table 1). Similarly, Crick et al.
([1957]) argued that the comma-less scheme was not just one particular scheme
but comprised a large class of distinct schemes (they calculated 288) that
shared the non-functional relation between twenty triplets and twenty
amino acids, but differed with respect to the identity of the twenty triplets.
So far I have used the neutral term ‘scheme’ for these proposals. This term
was in fact often employed at the time (Crick [1955], pp. 3, 9), not least by
biochemists and biophysicists who were not among Crick’s or Gamow’s im-
mediate co-workers (Dounce [1955]; Schwartz [1955]; Wilkins [1957]).
However, ‘scheme’ was just one of several labels used to denote the proposed
solutions to the coding problem between 1953 and 1958. Another, less fre-
quently used, term was ‘assignment’ (Dounce [1955]). Most interesting for the
purposes of this article was the term ‘code’. This term was used in several
different senses, one of which was as a synonym for ‘scheme’ or ‘assignment’.4
The first usage of ‘code’ in this sense appears in undated documents from 1953
to 1954 by Crick (for example, ‘Diamond code’ (Crick [1953–4], p. 3)) and in
Gamow’s letters in the first half of 1954 (for example, ‘code of triangles’
(Gamow [1954d]). Both authors used the term ‘code’ regularly, though not
exclusively. In print, Gamow initially wavered between more neutral terms
and the semantically loaded ‘code’. At times he referred to ‘the proposed
scheme’ (Gamow [1954b], p. 6) and a ‘unique correspondence’ and ‘transla-
tion procedure’ (Gamow [1954a]). In late 1954 Gamow moved from a ‘unique
coding procedure’ to ‘the code in question’ (Gamow and Metropolis [1954],
p. 779).5 So the code metaphor was clearly employed many years before the
actual code began to be elucidated in the early 1960s, as has been pointed out
before (Judson [1996]; Kay [2000]). But it is worth emphasizing not only that
the protagonists of the theoretical approaches to protein synthesis used the
term in the 1950s, but also that they employed this term in a specifically sci-
entific context, namely, when thinking about their research and communicat-
ing their ideas among themselves. Crick employed ‘code’ for personal record
keeping, as his notebooks on Gamow’s scheme testify (Crick [1953–54]). The
term also figured in the informal and semi-formal discourse among Gamow,
Crick, and their collaborators: it appears in their private letters, which com-
municated, alongside the gamut of personal news, the latest research activities
4 The word ‘code’ was also employed in other ways, for instance, it was used interchangeably with
a base sequence (Watson and Crick [1953b], p. 965) or an ‘alphabet’—for example, the set of
twenty different amino acids (Gamow et al. [1956], p. 24). This article is only concerned with
‘code’ in the mapping sense.
5 Sarkar argues that Gamow’s use of ‘code’ in 1954 can be traced back directly to Schro¨dinger’s
([1944]) ‘codescript’ (personal communication, cf. Sarkar [2013]).
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(for example, Gamow [1954c], [1954d], [1954e]); and it was used when articu-
lating preliminary results and ideas for internal discussion (for example, Crick
[1955]; Drake and Alderson [1956]). Its appearance in official publications was
but the outwardly visible aspect of its use.6
3 The Code Concept Played Descriptive and Explanatory Roles
The previous section described how the code metaphor was used by scientists
like Crick and Gamow in the 1950s. They began using the term ‘code’ in the
context of early research into protein synthesis, especially for the purposes of
internal communication and personal record-keeping. In conjunction with
prefixes like ‘diamond’, the term picked out a variety of hypothetical schemes
that addressed a specific aspect of the mechanism of protein synthesis.7 From
the way these scientists actually employed the code concept, it is apparent that
it referred to several distinct, hypothetical schemes. Furthermore, each scheme
postulated hypothetical, physical components, and a mapping relation be-
tween template units and amino acids. The components and relations were
ordinary physical entities (for example, molecules), processes (for example,
chemical interactions), and structural features (set-theoretic relations). There
was no indication that the schemes involved any semantic properties (but see
below for similarities with human symbol systems). Hence, although the code
concept was never formally defined, it was employed in scientific discourse
with a definite, albeit variable, content. It was a quasi-technical concept with a
clear descriptive-denotational role.
In addition, the hypothetical mechanisms could explain, in outline, how
sequences of four nucleic acid bases might specify sequences of twenty
amino acids. The coding schemes were, after all, potential solutions of the
coding problem. More specifically, coding schemes offered mechanistic ex-
planations because they cited the central causal components and relational
features that together were thought to be responsible for generating amino
acid chains. And they were possible explanations because the descriptions
specified how the outcome might be produced (and they all turned out to be
false). Despite omitting many details about the nature of the components and
their interactions, the coding schemes were informative. They were sufficiently
specific so as to be distinct from other how-possibly explanations, such as
6 The schemes listed in Tables 1 and 2 were those explicitly labelled ‘code’ between 1953–58. Other
schemes published during this time (Dounce [1955]; Schwartz [1955]) were not referred to as
‘codes’, by their inventors or by commentators such as Stent ([1955]) and Crick ([1957c]).
7 The arguments in this article do not depend on any particular account of mechanism and thus
remain neutral on this point (for discussion see, for example, Machamer et al. [2000]; Glennan
[2002]; Torres [2009]).
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those hypothesizing that amino acid sequences are determined by a set of
enzymes. Furthermore, scientists like Crick, Gamow, and Brenner explicitly
presented coding schemes as solutions to the coding problem and had thus
recognized their explanatory value. The codes of the 1950s thus served as how-
possibly explanations.
The descriptive and explanatory roles of the code metaphors can be shar-
pened by distinguishing between mechanism schemas and sketches
(Machamer et al. [2000]). A mechanism schema is a (propositional or pictor-
ial) representation of a fully known mechanism, describing its various com-
ponents and how they are organized so as to generate a mechanism’s outcome
from its starting conditions. By contrast, mechanism sketches are representa-
tions of more or less unknown mechanisms; they are incomplete and some-
times false. It is easily seen that the various codes were descriptions of a
mechanism because they described hypothetical components and organiza-
tional features of the mechanism of protein synthesis; and they were mechan-
ism sketches because they omitted many details and many of those not omitted
turned out to be false. Furthermore, mechanism sketches can vary in the
amount of detail they provide (Craver and Darden [2013]). This feature cap-
tures an important source of variation among coding schemes. As we saw,
some schemes were more specific than others (cf. diamond code versus
comma-less code). I will return to this point in Section 4. Finally, the idea
of mechanism schemas or sketches is useful because it reminds us that mech-
anisms do not merely consist of physical components and their interactions,
but that they are also organized in a specific way. The mapping between
template units and amino acids was the main organizational feature of
codes. A mapping like degeneracy, for instance, was independent of the
kind of template unit posited by a coding scheme and was thus shared by
several schemes. I take these findings to extend Darden and Craver’s ([2002])
previous mechanistic reconstruction of early work on protein synthesis.
Darden and Craver focused on molecular biologists’ changing views about
the main components of protein synthesis—especially the status of RNA(s)
and the chemical bonds involved in ordering amino acids—arguing that their
views amounted to mechanism sketches. I agree that their views were sketches.
However, Darden and Craver did not discuss the nature of coding schemes
(apart from the diamond code) and thus left open the relation of these schemes
to mechanisms.
We can now put the conclusion from the foregoing analysis of actual usage
as follows: The coding schemes of the 1950s were mechanism sketches, that is,
descriptions of hypothetical components and organizational features of one
important aspect of the mechanism of protein synthesis. By picking out these
schemes in the context of scientific discourse, the code concept played a sig-
nificant descriptive and explanatory role for the scientists. In the first instance,
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this is a historical-descriptive claim about the roles ‘code’ played in the 1950s.
But there is also a conceptual-normative claim here, namely, that employing
the code metaphor was justified and reasonable at least partly because it
played these roles. These conclusions are broadly in line with Godfrey-
Smith’s ([2000], [2003]) defence of the code metaphor.8
4 The Abstractness of Codes and the Expendability of the Code
Concept
This section considers two worries, one against the historical claim and an-
other against the normative thesis. I will take these in turn.
The idea that the coding schemes were mechanism sketches seems to conflict
with a common characterization of coding. Following Crick ([1955]); Crick
et al. [1957]), the coding problem is often said to be an ‘abstract’ (Judson [1996],
p. 248; Sarkar [1996], p. 193) or ‘formal’ (Sarkar [1996], p. 191) problem—that
is, a problem distinct from considerations of the mechanistic details of protein
synthesis (Judson [1996], p. 248; Sarkar [1996], p. 191). As Sarkar put it:
By this point Gamow had clearly distinguished the abstract coding
problem, ‘that of translating a four letter code to a twenty letter code’
[(Gamov et al. [1956], p. 24)], from that of finding the mechanism of
translation. (Sarkar [1996], p. 193)
It is natural to understand such characterizations of codes and the coding
problem as asserting a contrast between coding, on the one hand, and the
mechanistic aspects of protein synthesis, on the other hand. To the extent that
Crick, Gamow, and others were concerned with coding, they were not con-
cerned with the mechanism. It will then seem unreasonable to think of the
coding schemes as mechanism sketches. Yet a closer look at Crick’s and
Gamow’s work reveals that there is in fact no tension and that even the
most abstract coding schemes were descriptions of mechanisms.
The main source for claims about the abstractness of the coding problem is
Francis Crick:
This problem [the ‘coding problem’] is a formal one. In essence it is not
concerned with either the chemical steps or the details of the stereo-
chemistry. It is not even essential to specify whether RNA or DNA is the
nucleic acid being considered. (Crick et al. [1957], p. 416)
8 Godfrey-Smith ([2003]) argued that the code concept is justified because (i) it picks out features
that explain the linear ordering of amino acids during protein synthesis and because (ii) these
features exhibit three specific similarities with human symbol systems. In contrast to
Godfrey-Smith’s account, my conclusions are based on an analysis of actual usage, which re-
veals that arbitrariness was not one of the intended positive analogies with human symbol
systems (see Section 5).
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Two years earlier Crick maintained that
Gamow’s scheme is essentially abstract. It originally paid lip-service to
structural considerations, but the position was soon reached when
‘coding’ was looked upon as a problem in itself, independent as far as
possible of how things might fit together. (Crick [1955], p. 6)
For Crick at least, both the coding problem and its solution were abstract.
While Crick contrasted coding with structural considerations and stereo-
chemistry, he did not explicitly identify the specific features that made
coding abstract. They can be gleaned, however, from Crick’s account of the
coding problem and the generalized Gamow code.
According to Crick, the coding problem centres around the mapping of four
types of things to twenty types of things (see his quote in Section 2.1). Such
mappings are relations between two sets, which can be described by means of
set-theoretic notions like surjectivity. Since these features are the subject
matter of a formal theory, it is reasonable to regard them as formal or ab-
stract. Another point Crick et al. ([1957]) emphasized was the irrelevance of
whether or not the template is RNA or DNA. This is a theme that can be
traced back to Crick’s generalized version of Gamow’s code (Crick [1955]).
Crick’s version included degeneracy, an organizational feature, thus contri-
buting to its abstractness. But the generalized version also makes claims about
components, especially about the template units (for example, that they are
overlapping triplets; see Section 2.2). As noted above, Crick developed the
generalized version by abstracting away from some of the assumptions asso-
ciated with Gamow’s diamond code, rendering it less detailed. The low-detail
character of Crick’s generalized version is another feature contributing to its
abstractness.
In conclusion, both the coding problem and its solution(s) involved (i) a
mapping between template units and amino acids, and thus a structural prop-
erty, as well as (ii) components that were described at varying levels of detail. I
suggest that these two features constitute (at least partly) the codes’ purported
abstractness. That is, coding schemes were abstract to the extent that they
included structural features and characterized the components at a low level of
detail. Crucially, neither source of abstractness conflicts with mechanistic con-
siderations. Quite the opposite: First, organizational features like the mapping
between templates units and amino acids are structural aspects of the mech-
anism of protein synthesis; they are not something extraneous to the mechan-
ism. Second, low-detail descriptions of triplets and so on are descriptions of
components of the mechanism of protein synthesis; such descriptions are not
concerned with something other than the mechanism. The apparent conflict
between the abstractness of coding schemes and their mechanistic commit-
ments is thus dissolved: the coding schemes of the 1950s were mechanism
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sketches, and they were abstract insofar as they included structural properties
and low-detail descriptions of components.
A second worry concerns the normative claim that the descriptive and ex-
planatory roles of the code metaphor justified its use. ‘Code’ was just one of
several terms used in order to refer to the mapping schemes. There was also
more neutral vocabulary, like ‘scheme’, ‘correspondence’, and ‘assignment’.
This suggests that there is some arbitrariness in choosing the term ‘code’ for
these schemes. This point was made forcefully by Lily Kay, who argued that
the use of ‘code’ was to a significant extent historically contingent, prompted
by the widespread use of crypto-analysis during WWII, the subsequent rise of
information technologies, and the personal connections of researchers like
Gamow with the US military (Kay [2000], pp. 2, 329). From this point of
view, the code metaphor offers no more than an auxiliary label. Its contribu-
tion was expendable, not substantial. Some philosophers have advanced ar-
guments to the same effect, albeit not specifically against the code metaphor.
These arguments are based on the possibility of replacing semantic with causal
language. For instance, Weber ([2005]) doubts the usefulness of the notion of
positional information by arguing that its content can be articulated in purely
causal terms; choosing informational language to describe and refer to that
content does not add anything useful.9 Similarly, Sˇustar ([2007]) re-interprets
the central dogma in causal terms and emphasizes that genetic information
can be given a purely causal interpretation. From this he concludes not only
that the case for a semantic interpretation of genetic information is weakened,
but also that the notion of genetic information can be shown to be superflu-
ous. While these objections were not targeted specifically against the genetic
code, they can easily be extended to it given the analysis of actual usage pre-
sented in this article. For ‘code’ picked out certain causal and structural
properties, and there was considerable flexibility in whether or not they
were referred to by ‘code’ or by more neutral, non-semantic terms.
Considerations like these can seem to undermine the theoretical value of the
code metaphor. After all, how significant can the metaphor be if it was
expendable?
We should distinguish between several issues here. One question is whether
the code concept, as it was or is used in molecular biology, involved semantic
commitments in some sense. The historical findings of this article strongly
suggest that it does not, at least not in the research context examined here.
Sarkar’s ([2003]) assertion that considerations about semantic properties are
alien to molecular biology is thus substantiated with respect to coding. I also
agree with the spirit of Weber’s and Sˇustar’s objection: claims about the code
9 Weber ([2006]) offers a causal construal of the central dogma. In his ([2005]), however, he was
careful to point out that the possibility of a causal reconstruction does not imply that ‘code’ or
‘information’ do no significant work.
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involved ordinary causal and structural commitments, and in this sense they
did not add anything extra. However, in contrast to Weber and Sˇustar, my
argument for this conclusion does not hinge on the success of any particular
causal reconstruction of the causal and structural properties denoted by
‘code’, nor does it rely on the socio-political arguments advanced by Kay
([2000]). I take the conclusion to follow from how the code metaphor was
used in practice.
A second issue concerns the extent to which the code played a substantive
theoretical role in molecular biology. This is a separate issue because, from the
fact that an apparently semantic concept (like code) did not entail semantic
commitments, it does not follow that without them it played no useful and
substantial role. It might have played roles that did not rely on attributing
semantic properties. Furthermore, the historical findings suggest that the code
metaphor did play such a role: it referred to a set of causal and structural
properties that could solve the coding problem. That is, ‘code’ was descriptive
and explanatory. And since the degree to which a scientific concept plays a
useful and substantial role depends partly on the degree to which it is descrip-
tive and explanatory, the code metaphor was useful and justified, at least to
the extent it played such roles. Lastly, the fact that alternative concepts like
‘scheme’ and ‘assignment’ were used to the same effect is consistent with the
code concept also playing such roles.
Finally, there is the worry that if a semantic concept does not add anything
extra, in particular nothing semantic, then using a semantic concept is obsolete
and even potentially misleading. It suggests semantic commitments where
there are none. In other words, the worry is that semantic language is spurious
and less appropriate when referring to ordinary causal or structural proper-
ties. Accordingly, one might concede that ‘code’ played descriptive and ex-
planatory roles (by referring to mapping schemes), while still maintaining that
it was inappropriate to construe the process as one of coding. This is a rea-
sonable concern. And yet, as I will now argue, the actual usage suggests that
the code concept was used appropriately and that it was in fact better suited
for these roles than more neutral notions.
Not any mapping between two sets qualifies as a conventional code or
cipher. Conventional codes are rather more specific kinds of mappings:
among other peculiarities, they typically relate the elements of two symbol
sets such that we can produce one string of symbols from the other (for ex-
ample, an English sentence from a message in Morse signs). Indeed, the ability
to generate one type of symbol sequence from another is one the central pur-
poses of conventional codes and ciphers. The coding schemes of the 1950s
shared this paradigmatic feature. The mappings that were hypothesized as
part of these schemes posited a set of relations between entities such that
one kind of sequence can be generated by means of another. Achieving this
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feat was thought to be the main contribution that these relations made to
protein synthesis (Section 2.2). Coding schemes did not posit set-theoretic
relations between elements that were not causally connected in this way. By
transferring the term ‘code’ from the source domain of human symbol systems
to molecular biology, it was possible to exploit this particular analogy. The
code metaphor conveyed the idea that the molecular mapping was not just any
kind of mapping, but rather a mapping by which one kind of sequence can be
generated by means of another—that is, a kind of mapping that could solve
the coding problem. For this reason, the term ‘code’ was an apt choice.
Furthermore, the code concept was more appropriate than neutral concepts
like ‘system’, ‘scheme’, and ‘assignment’. The latter notions entail, at best, that
there is a mapping between elements, but not that the mapping enables the
generation of one kind of sequence from another. Since they could not convey
this critical feature, they were less well suited for picking out the molecular
relations in question. Replacing ‘code’ with a non-semantic notion would thus
have incurred a cost.10
5 The Role of Arbitrariness
In this last section I consider the significance of arbitrariness for understand-
ing the role of coding schemes. According to an influential line of thought, the
arbitrariness of human symbol systems is analogous to the absence of a ‘chem-
ical necessity’ between the codon-amino acid assignments of the genetic code
(Godfrey-Smith [2000]; Maynard Smith [2000]). Human symbol systems like
the Morse code are arbitrary insofar as the form of a Morse symbol is not tied
to its meaning (Maynard Smith [2000], p. 185). The physical properties of the
symbol ‘  ’, for example, do not compel the dots to stand for ‘S’; nor do
they prevent the dots from being assigned to a different letter. Analogously,
the argument goes, the physico-chemical properties of any given codon do not
restrict it to specify only the amino acids it presently specifies: if the tRNAs
complementary to a given codon changed their stereochemical properties so
that they became complementary to an aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase that
10 This should be understood as a claim about the factual benefit of the code metaphor, rather than
a claim about the intentions of molecular biologists. I do not maintain that they deliberately
exploited the metaphor for this purpose. This is because there are few sources that reveal their
motivation for introducing and using the code metaphor. Perhaps the most explicit remark
about the motivation at the time was Watson’s observation that protein synthesis bears ‘obvious
analogies to conventional coding problems in which we go from one language to another’ (Crick
et al. [1954–55]). He did not specify the ‘obvious analogies’. But he described ‘conventional
coding problems’ as going from one language to another, thus suggesting a process of translat-
ing strings of symbols from one language to another. And in such a process, coding relates the
elements of the languages such that one can produce one symbol string from the other. So the
argument above is at least compatible with Watson’s remark.
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carries a different amino acid,11 then the same codon would end up specifying
a different amino acid. Several authors have argued that this analogy is an
important motivation for the code concept (Godfrey-Smith [2000]; Maynard
Smith [2000]; Kjosavik [2007]; Barbieri [2008]). The intended content and
scope of this claim remain somewhat unclear. It can be interpreted historic-
ally, for example, as a claim about why scientists like Crick and Gamow began
using the term ‘code’. It could also be taken normatively, as providing a ra-
tionale or justification for its use. However, neither claim seems plausible in
the light of the present findings about actual usage.
Consider first the historical claim that the code metaphor was introduced
and/or employed in the 1950s at least partly in order to highlight the analogy
with the arbitrariness of conventional symbols. This claim is implausible.
First, I found no evidence that arbitrariness of human symbol systems was
discussed or investigated between 1953 and 1958, either in connection with
direct or with indirect coding schemes. Second, the early schemes were incom-
patible with arbitrariness because they posited direct assembly of amino acid
chains on templates. In a direct assembly scheme, a given template unit can
specify a different amino acid only if it is assumed that the unit changes its
stereochemical properties so as to become directly complementary to a differ-
ent amino acid; the unit’s functional groups would need to be modified, added,
or eliminated. Since any such change would alter the units’ molecular struc-
ture, it would cease to be the same unit as defined by that structure. It was thus
impossible for the units of early, direct assembly schemes to specify an amino
acid other than the one it was taken to specify. In other words, direct assembly
schemes excluded the possibility of arbitrariness. It is thus hard to see how
arbitrariness could have motivated the construal of these schemes as codes.
Let us turn to the normative claim, which comes in different strengths. A
comparatively weak claim is that arbitrariness contributes to the justification
of the code metaphor (for example, Maynard Smith [2000]). A stronger claim
is that arbitrariness is crucial, perhaps even necessary, for its justification. The
stronger view seems to underpin a thought experiment by Godfrey-Smith
([2000], [2003]). Godfrey-Smith invites us to imagine a world in which protein
synthesis proceeds without coding and then asks whether, if coding were
absent, other features of an organism’s biology would need to be different
as well. Here I focus not on the outcome of the thought experiment, but rather
on the idea of protein synthesis without coding. According to Godfrey-Smith,
there would be no coding if the template was an amino acid chain and incom-
ing amino acids paired up like-with-like. Such a mechanism would involve
neither arbitrariness nor two distinct classes of molecules (since both template
and product would be proteins), and it is presumably for these reasons that
11 These are the enzymes that catalyse the attachment of amino acids to their specific tRNAs.
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Godfrey-Smith deemed it inappropriate to construe the mechanism as a
coding process. So, on this view, arbitrariness seems to be a crucial component
in justifying coding talk. The idea is perhaps that arbitrariness is so central to
human symbol systems that its absence in the biological system would render
the similarity superficial and, hence, the code metaphor poorly motivated. As
a consequence, the scientists who construed direct assembly schemes as coding
processes would have been misguided.
The actual usage of the code metaphor suggests, however, that there is no
compelling reason to hang so much weight on arbitrariness. Admittedly, the
lack of arbitrariness in some coding schemes does constitute a disanalogy with
human symbol systems. But disanalogies abound and do not by themselves
undermine the power of an analogy. The coding metaphor could serve to
highlight other similarities that are as salient as arbitrariness. In fact, there
is an important similarity that commentators have so far overlooked: human
symbol systems and the hypothetical template amino acid assignments are
both instances of mapping relations that enable one sequence of entities to
be generated from another (as argued in the previous section). Since the sci-
entists’ primary goal was to understand how nucleic acid sequences could
determine amino acid sequences (the ‘coding problem’), it is not difficult to
see that the code metaphor emphasized this analogy. Furthermore, the fact
that both direct and indirect assembly schemes were construed as coding
processes indicates that the similarity in generating sequences outweighed
the disanalogy arising from arbitrariness.
The value and legitimacy of scientific concepts depends at least partially on
their theoretical and heuristic usefulness. The code metaphor did well on this
benchmark, and it did so even without arbitrariness. Schemes without arbi-
trariness were just as explanatory as schemes with arbitrariness (cf. diamond
versus comma-less code). And schemes lacking arbitrariness did not in any
way have less of a descriptive-denotational role. So the code metaphor was
justified to a significant extent by its descriptive and explanatory roles, and
these roles were independent of arbitrariness.
6 Conclusions
This article reconsidered the legitimacy of the code concept in molecular gen-
etics. I analysed how the code metaphor was actually employed by the scien-
tists who first promoted its use in the 1950s. The analysis showed (i) that the
term ‘code’ had multiple referents, namely, schemes that accounted for how
nucleic acids might determine amino acid sequences; (ii) the schemes were
mechanism sketches, consisting of more or less detailed, and often false, de-
scriptions of ordinary molecular components, processes, and structural prop-
erties of the mechanism of protein synthesis; (iii) none of the schemes included
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recognizably semantic properties, and many early codes excluded the possi-
bility of arbitrariness; and (iv) it played at least two valuable theoretical roles,
namely, describing and designating mechanism sketches by exploiting a spe-
cific analogy with human symbol systems, as well as providing how-possibly
explanations for the ordering of amino acids by nucleic acids.
These conclusions are compatible with the view that the code is essentially
‘abstract’. I argued that coding schemes can be construed as abstract to the
extent that they provided low-detail descriptions of components and empha-
sized structural features of the mechanism of protein synthesis. Furthermore,
the fact that more neutral terms like ‘scheme’ were also used to pick out the
same mechanism sketches does not undermine the appropriateness of using the
semantically loaded concept of code. Its justification stems from its theoretical
roles and from highlighting a distinct similarity with human symbol systems.
At some point after 1958, leading researchers like Crick emphasized the
purportedly accidental nature of the genetic code and thereby invited analo-
gies with the arbitrariness of human symbol systems. But arbitrariness played
no discernible role in the development of early coding schemes and was in fact
incompatible with many of them. Historically, arbitrariness was an idea added
after the code had become established among molecular geneticists. And, from
a philosophical point of view, arbitrariness is unnecessary for justifying the
code concept in molecular biology.
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